As the Russian stock market is sent into a frenzy following Putin's forceful annexation of Crimea, the world looks at the Russian leader in order to divine what his grand plan is.
Many are agreed that Crimea might just be the beginning of a long term annexation plan that seeks to revive the old glory of the Soviet Republics, and does also fit with what seems to be a new, almost messianic attitude adopted by Putin. The uglier truth is that Putin is scrambling on several fronts to both stem the financial bleeding from diminished energy revenues - and the protection of those sources - and also the need to stop the relentless advance of European and Nato encroachment into what Russia, and Putin see, as their sphere of influence. If the glory of Russia is to survive, the Russian belief goes, the advance of Nato inclusions and influence must be stemmed at all costs.
Although Crimea's annexation is a very complicated mix of history, strategy and pressing military concerns, such as maintaining the only naval lanes to the middle east and the Asian provinces, the possibility of Putin enacting a vision of reviving "mother Russia" by retaking the territories it held until the fall of the Berlin wall is fast becoming Europe and the West's nightmare.
However, there are financial and economic elements that might preclude Putin's dream. In the past decade, the ex KGB director seems to have made a radical shift from old ideologies to new ones that harken back to czarist Russia, with both a reapproachment with the Orthodox church and the adoption of symbolism and propaganda that seem to want to return Russia to a grandeur that has nothing to do with its communist period.
In the midst of this transformation, there is the rampant corruption and graft that is the hallmark of Putin's rule, before, during and after the planting of Medvedev in the chief position for his own sake.
Graft is nothing new in Russia, a byproduct of a flourishing black market that was the only means during the century long communist rule to obtain necessary and unobtainable goods. But with Putin, everything transformed on a grand scale. It is no secret that a cadre of cronies surrounds Putin like a gaggle of greedy satellites. Money from nationalized interests, many deriving from illegally expropriated energy interests previously privately held by some of the so called Russian oligarchs, is now flowing both in secret accounts that belong to this cadre and to Putin's own, and some in Russia's coffers; but these revenues are also the only true income that is propping Putin's regime from falling into deep recession.
The boom of the 1990's has all but dissipated. The vital revenues of oil and gas are the only things that can keep the Russian economy from collapsing, and even those seem to be vanishing. And that's because Russia's bullying of its gas and energy clients has caused many in Europe to seek alternatives.
But Ukraine is still in the cross hairs, mainly because it is both a client and a conduit for Russian gas and oil. And most US and European generals are warning that Ukraine and later Belarus and other countries previously under Russian rule might be invaded and annexed.
But is it wise for Russia to invade Ukraine? By securing the oil and gas lines, Russia would be both losing a client and have to keep costly military operations active in Ukraine for an indeterminate period of time. There is also the risk that the opposition could blow up the pipelines that deliver the energy to Putin's clients in Europe. The destruction of such conduits could spell quick ruin for Russia. I also make the invasion more probable every day. Energy is the catch-22 for both Ukraine and Russia.
The only thing that is sure, is that Putin has chosen the right place and time to make his deft move. The West and Europe are in no way interested in responding militarily to Russia's aggression. Nor can Putin afford to lose Ukraine to Nato, and find Nato missiles at his door. The possibility of Ukraine being retaken becomes more real every day. The west needs Russia too: energy, a vigorous commerce between EU members and Russia, and the ISS station are all concerns that are shackling the West from mounting a proper rebuttal to PUtin's actions.
Putin for his part is stoking those fears with almost reckless gusto. In a speech to the Duma, Putin all but justified his actions, and his future ones, with the notion that any action to retake or bring old territories under Russian rule again is purposely to defend those Russian nationals basically 'trapped' in those lost territories.
Even though Putin asserts that he wants nothing to do with the invasion of Ukraine, the 20,000 troops amassed on the Eastern borders of Ukraine speak otherwise. All that is needed is a spark, an excuse, an interference.
To make matters worse a pro-Soviet demonstration is planned this week. If any disorders occur and there is loss of life, Putin will have his excuse to invade mainland Ukraine handed to him on a silver platter.
There are many other countries that gained independence after 1989. Moldova, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belarus. In all of those countries, lives a strong majority of ethnic Russians.
Nato's Fogh Rasmussen has already warned against a wider land grab on the part of Russia. No matter how the annexation of Crimea is justified or not, there is little anyone can do. But what comes next is something the rest of the world can do something about. Wit its economy reeling, Russia can ill afford any military conflict or long term occupation, and even less strong sanctions, which are still to materialize.
But is Putin, as some contend, reacting to Western aggression? Is Putin right in fearing what seems to be an unfettered advance of Nato, with Turkey and now Ukraine as possible members? If Ukraine, integral of Crimea had or would become part of Nato, Russia would lose its naval bases, just as it risks doing if Bashar al Assad's regime falls in Syria.
One of the issues with Crimea's annexation is that the West stood inactive when Russia annexed Ossetia in Georgia a few years ago, a move that if contrasted effectively at the time, might have allowed the West to prevent the spectacular fall of Crimea into Putin's hands.
For those people who thought that Putin wanted Russia to become part of the international community and financial markets, the latest moves show just how insular Putin has become and by reflection how insular Russia will become. Already Russians believe in the myth of Russian exceptionalism, and Putin's constant drumming of the nationalist ideal does not nothing less than reinforce those notions.
But Russia cannot retreat and retrench to what is essentially a pre-1980's position, politically an economically. That insularity is exactly what caused it to fall and to lose its occupied territories in 1989. Even with the wind in his sails, at least as far as the Russians citizens approval of his actions, Putin will have to reckon with the coming recession and regression of Russia's economy.
Op-Ed
partial sources : CNN, Brookings/washpost/al jazeera: 3.23.14
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