Just recently, vice president Biden was asked what keeps him up at night. His response? Pakistan.
Even though Pakistan is not nearly in the same condition as neighboring Afghanistan or even Syria, it is on the verge of losing control of the terrorist group that have been sheltered or have found refuge in the mountain provinces and even in large cities like Karachi.
The increasingly sectarian nature of the attacks should prompt Pakistan to address the problem more aggressively and in novel ways. Instead Pakistan is seeking insistently to include a group like the Taliban, whose agenda precludes any meaningful participation in a democratic process.
Pakistan is still living in the 1980's when it romantically looked at the Afghanistan-Russia conflict as a personal mission to aid a neighbor. Most of the mujahedeen who fought side to side under the aegis of the American CIA operations were native of the independent provinces and Pakistan.
For that reason, Pakistan is still loath to go after terrorist groups, even though it does some token work to contrast so it still receives funding from the United States. It also allows the US to effect drone strikes against the terrorist strongholds, which does little to reduce the view that the US is indifferent to the plight of civilians and disrespectful of the country's sovereignty, but it removes the burden and the perception that the Pakistani military is going after the terrorist group itself.
But the recent, aggressive moves to include the Taliban seem to be so naive and dogged, that it brings the question of what is Pakistan's understanding of the evolution of terrorist groups within its borders and what their true intentions are for the future of Pakistan. There is almost a sense that the whole country is splintering along sectarian lines, and that can only play in the hands of the Taliban.
Although talks are underway, and there may even be some agreement reached, there is absolutely no evidence that the Taliban is in the talks to determine how they would participate in the newly formed government or earnestly abide by any law.
Although a cease fire has been tentatively agreed upon, the agreement has not been signed by either the Prime Minister nor the Taliban, bringing into question the feasibility of an accord and the motivations one each side for the talks.
At issue is the fact that any participation or inclusion of the Taliban would have to be within the framework of the existing constitution as a precondition. However, the Taliban has rejected the constitution as un-Islamic and would only agree to a constitutional framework that strictly adhered to a brand of shari'a law they approve of.
In addition, a high ranking member of the Taliban has requested that the constitutional precondition be lifted, and opined that "there would be no problem if our constitution were the Quran and the Sunnah". This attitude on the part of the Taliban, in the scope of the talks and in general, should be indicative of how little fruit such negotiations would bear.
Some experts contend that the sharia implimentation, if confined to the independent provinces could work, as long as the Taliban is not asking for it to be adopted in the whole country.
But do Pakistan's independent provinces truly need to parlay their autonomy into a sharia state that would become even more appealing as a refuge for radical Islamists? And what assurance is there that the Taliban would restrict itself to a confined area, when its sectarian attacks have spanned the entire country, from Lahore, to Islamabad to Karachi.
Some also contend that Pakistan is courting the Taliban because it is an effective counter to India's growing influence in Afghanistan, which they see as increasing once the US withdraws next year.
The problem, however, is the age old duplicity of the Pakistan framework. On one side, the Military wants to push the Taliban out, while the ISI is doggedly supportive of the extremist group. The two use the Taliban as the principal pawn in a power struggle that gives no indication of ending in the near future. Indicative of how the Taliban is used in the power struggle, was the defeat of the PPP party in favor of the party that was amenable to a Taliban inclusion.
Beside being a cunning political manouver, which has been adopted by PM Sharif, and his rival, Imran Khan, the expressed willingness to make peace, and include the Pakistani Taliban into some limited part or form of government speaks to the country's perception that the Taliban is part of the political fabric and that, although they are responsible for innumerable attacks, their plight actually resonates with many Pakistani.
But why does it resonate? In many ways, as we have seen earlier, there is still the willingness to protect those rebels who had fought abroad, but there is also an acceptance at certain levels of society and especially in the autonomous provinces, of their ideology and extreme beliefs.
In fact, a political commentator, Aamir Khakwani asserts that there "is no harm in negotiating with the pro-peace members of a militant group." This type of discourse however has a gaping hole staring through it: the part of the Taliban that is not pro-preace, and it might be in the majority, will carry on as usual even if a portion of their membership opts for peace and inclusion. Splintering of groups causes a re-entrenchment that can be even more radicalized than the original group. A case in point is ISIS and Al Nusra, now at odds with its mentor group Al Qaeda.
On the other hand, there are many Pakistanis who want to see the government mount a full-on assault to finally rout and defeat the Pakistani Taliban. Those people were very much disappointed to learn that Sharif was so vested in trying to bring the Taliban to the fold.
Some political analysts are much more cynical, and realistic, about the prospect of the Taliban changing their way in lieu of some concession or inclusion, and believe that the only way to solve the problem is the eliminate them, in total, where they stand, because a government that negotiates with terrorists is a government that is perceived as being weak. That perception almost always emboldens terrorist groups.
Even a prominent Shi'a cleric, understandably, denounces the government's quest to include the Taliban as a "fool's quest". His position is quite valid: the Sunni lead terrorist groups have wrought havoc on the Shi'a communities, and have intensified sectarian bomb attacks on Shi'a people and mosques in the recent past. There is furthermore, no reason to believe that whatever accord is struck with the terrorist groups, that they would halt attacks of a sectarian nature.
Pakistan is sitting on a very large cache of nuclear weapons. There is no reason to believe that the Taliban is not entertaining the latest round of talks in the hope of one day, through inclusion or otherwise, they could get their hands on the weapons that could threaten the stability of the world.
OP_ED
Partial Source : Deutsche Welle/ 1.9.14
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